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The Story of Prudential Standing
by S. TODD BROWN*

Introduction
Imagine that you have been injured. Federal law clearly
provides a remedy. You commence suit in a federal court with
jurisdiction over the dispute, and your claims satisfy the requirements
of Article III. The court acknowledges all of these factors and its
obligation to hear and determine the merits of your suit. Yet the
court decides, in its sole discretion, that it would not be prudent to
recognize your standing. Your case is dismissed. Why? Perhaps you
were denied prudential standing due to your nationality or residential
status, or maybe the court applied a test that was not designed with
claims like yours in mind, or maybe the judge crafted a novel
1
prudential rule for your case.
Prudential standing—“prudential rules of self-restraint” that bar
2
standing to those “ill-suited to litigate the claims they assert” —lies at
3
the heart of a “confusing tangle of jurisprudential concepts.”
4
Although “not exhaustively defined,” the doctrine has, until recently,
incorporated three core principles: (i) generalized grievances; (ii) the
5
zone of interests; and (iii) third-party standing. It is treated as
distinct from constitutional standing, which, at a minimum, requires
the plaintiff to “demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that
* Associate Professor, Buffalo Law School. The author wishes to thank Christine
Bartholomew, Sue Mangold, Rick Su, Bert Westbrook and Jim Wooten for their
extensive and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 119 (1979).
3. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Silberman, J., concurring).
4. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (prudential standing includes: “the
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring
adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.”). These principles are outlined more fully in Part I.B,
infra.
[95]
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the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and that
6
the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Yet the place of standing—and prudential standing in
particular—is perplexing.
If the court has the power (i.e.,
jurisdiction) to adjudicate, it has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to
7
8
Constitutional standing, which is jurisdictional, speaks
do so.
directly to the court’s power to adjudicate, but prudential standing
9
does not. Technically speaking, prudential standing is not really
“standing” at all; it is merely a judicially crafted set of exceptions to
the obligation to hear and decide matters that are within the court’s
10
jurisdiction.
Consider a few more points. Sometimes, a constitutional
standing rule is declared prudential; other times, a prudential
11
standing rule is declared constitutional. A rule might appear once
and only once, or it might evolve into something far removed from its
12
origins over a short period of time. And as of this writing, nobody
can say for certain whether the third party standing principle is
13
prudential, constitutional, or something else.

6. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). The Court has characterized these as
the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Others have argued constitutional standing is not as “irreducible” as
it is made out to be. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 171 (2012) (“Although it is hardly
obvious from analysis of the constitutional text, the Supreme Court has long held that
Article III compels most of the requirements of the standing doctrine. But for years now,
the Justices and the cognoscenti of federal practice have known that this is not true—and
that the Court’s own decisions prove the point.”); Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential
Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009) (arguing that all standing should be
considered prudential, not constitutional).
7. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820 (1976).
8. E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (noting that the Court has “always
insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement”).
9. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional, 64 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 413 (2013) (approaching the question from different perspectives and
concluding that prudential standing is sufficiently distinct from constitutional standing to
be considered nonjurisdictional).
10. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 677 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Because these prudential
principles are ‘limits’ on standing, they do not themselves create jurisdiction; they exist
only to remove jurisdiction where the Article III standing requirements are otherwise
satisfied.”).
11. As outlined in Parts I.B.1 and II.B, the Court reclassified the formerly prudential
generalized grievances principle as constitutional and the formerly constitutional question
of adverseness as prudential.
12. See infra Part II.A (discussing ad hoc prudential rules and the evolution of the
substantial prior connections test and pecuniary interest test).
13. See infra Part I.B.3.
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To some extent, this captures the gist of the criticism of standing
doctrine generally. Critics argue that the doctrine finds little support
14
in the language of Article III and early American legal history. Its
15
“tortured constitutional discourse” has been characterized, among
16
other things, as permeated with “doctrinal confusion,” “hopelessly
17
incoherent and subject to manipulation,” a “pointless constraint on
18
the courts,” and driven by substantive or normative assessments
19
masquerading as threshold jurisdictional inquiries. Members of the
20
Court have criticized standing as a “word game played by secret
21
22
Collectively, these
rules,” and “cover” for dubious analysis.
critiques suggest that “standing can apparently be either rolled out or
23
ignored in order to serve unstated and unexamined values.”
Given the limited attention it receives in its own right, however,
prudential standing may seem to be little more than standing
doctrine’s forgotten stepchild. First impressions can be deceiving.
From its origins in narrow rules of self-governance to today, its
24
evolution wreaked havoc on established justiciability concepts and
14. E.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (“There
was no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 170–71 (1992) (“The first period, by far the longest, ranges from the
founding era to roughly 1920. In that period, there was no separate standing doctrine at
all.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) (discussing the history of standing doctrine); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224–25 (1988) (discussing the
origins of standing doctrine and noting that it “is a relatively recent creation”).
15. Laura A. Cisneros, Standing Doctrine, Judicial Technique, and the Gradual Shift
from Rights-Based Constitutionalism to Executive-Centered Constitutionalism, 59 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2009).
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1458 (1988).
17. Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221,
225–26 (2008); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008) (“Although seemingly simple on its face, this doctrine
[injury in fact] has produced an incoherent and confusing law of federal courts.”).
18. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007).
19. Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663–64, 699 (1977).
20. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 498 (1966)
(statement of Professor Paul A. Freund)).
21. Flast, 392 U.S. at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. Allen, 468 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 635, 658 (1985).
24. See infra Part II.A and note 219.
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the substantive development of specialized areas of law. In the
process, it has become something of a jurisdictional alchemist;
25
transforming jurisdictional considerations into “flexible rules” and
26
It
nonjurisdictional questions into pseudo-jurisdictional bars.
deserves more attention than it receives.
This article tells the story of prudential standing, outlines its
shortcomings, and frames a solution: prudential standing should be
removed from standing doctrine.
Part I picks up the story as two of prudential standing doctrine’s
key principles—generalized grievances and third party standing—rest
comfortably in New Deal-era judicial rules of self-restraint. These
and other rules were informed by the Court’s interwoven visions of
the limits of judicial power and the wise use of that power; but they
both spoke to the same issue: shaping the Court’s understanding of its
proper role in a democratic system. The Burger Court divided this
often confusing doctrine into the “constitutional” and “prudential”
branches we have today. Yet the Court also recognized new
prudential rules that spoke less to the judicial role than to other
concerns. This section concludes by discussing recent developments
that leave the future of prudential standing in doubt.
Part II analyzes the historical transformation of the meaning of
“prudential standing” and the concurrent distortion of some of its
principles. First, it demonstrates that the understanding of the term
“prudential” has evolved, incorrectly, to suggest that courts have the
power to adopt ad hoc and policy-driven rules. This discussion
highlights the great irony of prudential standing: a doctrine developed
to restrict courts to their properly limited role evolved into one that
encouraged them to exceed that role. Second, this section explains
how the artificial bifurcation of standing doctrine along
“constitutional” and “prudential” lines breeds confusion, especially

25. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013).
26. Radha Pathak expounded upon this concern with respect to “statutory standing”
and the zone of interests test. See generally Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the
Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 111 (2009) (“One of the harms caused by the
careless use of the term ‘statutory standing’ is that lower courts assume that the question
of whether the plaintiff falls within the class of persons to whom Congress has extended
the private right of action has some special significance. That is, lower courts often elevate
the statutory standing question above other questions that should be treated similarly.
They elevate the question by making it a threshold inquiry, which means it must be
considered first and separate from other questions regarding whether the plaintiff may
ultimately recover. Some courts not only make the statutory standing question a threshold
one; they make it jurisdictional.”). As explained in Part II.A, infra, this occurs with other
prudential standing doctrines involving statutory and constitutional causes of action.
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with respect to principles that may be characterized as falling under
either category.
Part III proposes the total dismantling of the prudential branch
of standing and demonstrates how reframing its remaining principles
will enhance clarity without disrupting the courts. This section
proposes a straightforward test for distinguishing prudential rules that
speak to standing and those that speak to other questions. It then
explains how third party standing is not properly characterized as a
distinct standing principle.

I. The Evolution of Prudential Standing
Article III limits the judicial function to the resolution of “cases”
27
and “controversies.” Thus, the federal judicial power is reserved to
28
the “adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties,” and
29
“this limitation applies at all stages of review.” Courts shape the
evolution of law, but they do so only as a by-product of consideration
30
of concrete disputes.
Federal courts employ a range of justiciability doctrines—
including standing, ripeness, mootness, political question and
abstention—to limit the matters before them to cases and
31
These doctrines “relate in part, and in different
controversies.
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition
but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional
and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative
32
judiciary in our kind of government.”

27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
28. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974).
29. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 305–06 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).
30. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (“Implicit in the foregoing is the philosophy that the
business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and that “cases and
controversies” are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances
that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor.
This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.”); Hon. Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
20 (1990) (“The proximity of the courts to discrete real-world disputes, while providing a
justification for lawmaking by the courts, also forms the perimeters outside of which the
judiciary may not legitimately perform this function.”).
31. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
32. Id. (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Bork, J., concurring)).
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Of the two distinct forms of standing—constitutional and
prudential—only the former is properly characterized as a
33
34
jurisdictional doctrine.
Constitutional standing requires that a
35
litigant present a “case” or “controversy.” This limitation is said to
36
be “built on separation-of-powers principles” and “gives meaning to
these constitutional limits by ‘identifying[] those disputes which are
37
appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’” Thus, courts
“must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits”
and instead “carefully inquire as to whether appellees have met their
burden of establishing that their claimed injury is personal,
38
particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.”
Once jurisdiction is clear, however, courts have a “virtually
unflagging obligation” to hear and determine the case or controversy
39
40
before them. This “heavy obligation” stems from the courts’ roles
both in checking the other branches and providing litigants with an
41
impartial forum to petition for redress of their injuries. Thus, as the
42
Court noted in Cohens v. Virginia, federal courts “have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
43
to the Constitution.”
Prudential standing has been a recognized exception to this
44
It has captured not only generally applicable
obligation.
principles—the zone of interests inquiry and the prohibitions on

33. See generally Mank, supra note 9, at 413 (approaching the question from different
perspectives and concluding that prudential standing is sufficiently distinct from
constitutional standing to be considered nonjurisdictional).
34. Although constitutional considerations may preclude standing on other grounds,
at a minimum, “a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered
‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and that
the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
35. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559 (noting that this “core component of standing is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”).
36. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
37. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560).
38. Raines, 521 U.S. at 820.
39. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817.
40. Id. at 820.
41. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986); N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–59 (1982).
42. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
43. Id. at 404.
44. See, e.g., ACLU, 493 F.3d at 677.
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45

generalized grievances and third-party standing —but also certain
specialized tests, such as those developed in connection with Lanham
46
47
Act false advertising cases and bankruptcy appeals. Some of these
principles may reflect mere “policy considerations” that “blend into
48
Others are little more than
constitutional limitations.”
reformulations of the question of whether the litigant has a cause of
49
action. Prudential standing may have jurisdictional consequences
inasmuch as it excuses the judicial obligation to hear and determine
the matter, but its principles have been characterized collectively as
50
“more flexible” judicial rules that may be restricted or expanded by
51
Congress.
Curiously, the Court has only recently focused on the inherent
contradiction in the last two paragraphs. On the one hand, a federal
52
53
court has a “heavy” and “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear
matters within its jurisdiction. On the other, it may, in its discretion,
54
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. How does this exception not swallow
the rule? If prudence defines the line between a valid refusal and one
that betrays the judicial role, what does “prudence” mean?
This section examines the origins of modern prudential standing
as a distinct doctrine in the Burger Court, the evolution of its core
principles over the last four decades, the Court’s abrupt removal of

45. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (identifying these principles as core components
of prudential standing).
46. See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1391–93 (2014) (discussing the various tests adopted by the lower courts to evaluate
zone of interests standing under the Lanham Act).
47. See generally S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious Limits
on Appellate Standing in Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569 (2007) (discussing the
pecuniary interest test adopted as a prudential limit on standing to appeal in bankruptcy).
48. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99, 99 n.20 (using third-party standing as an example).
49. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 (concluding that the zone of interests
principle merely goes to whether the litigant has a cause of action); see also Fletcher, supra
note 14, at 223, 229 (arguing that some components of standing go to whether the party
has a cause of action); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974) (standing issues are
best addressed as a question of the litigant’s claim for relief).
50. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702.
51. See, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 830 (Congress may grant a particular right that
eliminates any prudential limitations, but it “cannot erase Article III’s standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise
have standing.”); Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 (same); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975) (same).
52. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 820.
53. Id. at 817.
54. See, e.g., ACLU, 493 F.3d at 677.
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two central principles from the prudential rubric, and the implications
of these opinions.
A. Shifting Perceptions of Standing
1. The Amorphous Origins of Prudential Standing

Prudential standing limitations did not just suddenly appear in
the Burger Court; they are reflected in earlier decisions that drew
upon the distinction between the “limits of power and the wise
55
exercise of power.” When Justice Frankfurter, for example, noted
the distinction between these “questions of authority and questions of
prudence,” he stressed that both spoke to the proper limits of the
56
judicial role. The latter, in his view, “precludes the Court’s giving
effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint
is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the
Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the
57
wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do.” In many
respects, this mirrored Justice Brandeis’ discussion of the rules
adopted by the Court, “for its own governance in the cases
confessedly within its jurisdiction,” to avoid unnecessarily passing on
58
the validity of a statute.
Yet the lines between the limits of judicial authority and prudent
self-restraint were never clearly defined. Some decisions suggested
that certain rules, such as adverseness, were demanded by Article
59
III. Other rules, such as the bar against third-party standing, were
characterized as judicially self-imposed but difficult to distinguish

55. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–46 (1936) (Brandeis, J.)
(also noting that declaring a statute invalid was one of “great gravity and delicacy” and
limited, in part, by the “rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to
actual cases and controversies”). Two of these rules—the limitation on hearing friendly
suits and the requirement that the plaintiff have an injury—focused on considerations that
implicate constitutional standing today. Id. at 346–48.
59. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151–52 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that Article III and regard for separation of powers
“restricts the courts of the United States to issues presented in an adversary manner”). In
the midst of this discussion of the requirements, he observed that these injuries must be
personal, not a generalized grievance. Id. at 151. He would reiterate this point a decade
later in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–04 (1961) (standing and other justiciability
doctrines “are but several manifestations—each having its own ‘varied application’—of
the primary conception that the federal judicial power is to be exercised to strike down
legislation, whether state or federal, only at the instance of one who is himself immediately
harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.”).
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60

from the constitutional limitations on the courts’ power. For the
most part, drawing a clearer distinction was unnecessary because both
spoke to the limits of the judicial power.
61
The distinction would be critical, however, in Flast v. Cohen.
62
Both Flast and Frothingham v. Mellon involved similar taxpayer
63
standing questions, and the Frothingham Court had previously
determined that mere status as a taxpayer did not confer standing to
64
challenge the constitutionality of a statute. The Court questioned
whether Frothingham expressed a constitutional bar to taxpayer
standing or merely imposed a “rule of self-restraint which was not
65
Frothingham was unsurprisingly
constitutionally compelled.”
unclear, blurring its constitutional and policy justifications for the
66
rule. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the taxpayer standing
rule was not required by the Constitution; it was merely one that
guided the inquiry into whether the taxpayer had a sufficient personal
67
After finding that each
stake and interest to satisfy Article III.
citizen has a right to challenge expenditures that are inconsistent with

60. In Barrows v. Jackson, Justice Minton noted that third-party standing limitation
is grounded in Article III and, citing Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander, characterized
the limitation as a “complementary rule of self-restraint for its own governance (not
always clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitation).” Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953). In United States v. Raines, Justice Brennan similarly grounded the
rule as one of self-restraint but grounded in constitutional concerns. United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (noting that the rule was grounded in the case or
controversy requirement).
61. Flast, 392 U.S. at 92–97.
62. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
63. In both cases, the litigant challenged the validity of congressional expenditures
and claimed standing solely as taxpayers. Flast, 392 U.S. at 92; Frothingham, 262 U.S. at
486.
64. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486–89.
65. Flast, 392 U.S. at 92.
66. Id. at 97 (citing Barrows and Ashwander to emphasize the tendency to blur these
considerations).
67. Id. at 101 (“A taxpayer may or may not have the requisite personal stake in the
outcome, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, we find no
absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly
unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs. There remains, however, the
problem of determining the circumstances under which a federal taxpayer will be deemed
to have the personal stake and interest that impart the necessary concrete adverseness to
such litigation so that standing can be conferred on the taxpayer qua taxpayer consistent
with the constitutional limitations of Article III.”).
This distinction between a
constitutional limit on the judicial power and a rule of self-restraint, and specifically the
courts’ discretion to ignore the latter, would be mirrored in the bifurcation of standing
doctrine into constitutional and prudential doctrines under the Burger Court.
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the Establishment Clause, the Court found that the litigants had
68
standing.
2. The Burger Court

The standing doctrine inherited by the Burger Court was thus
unified in purpose—shaping the courts’ visions of their role—but
69
amorphous in practice. As a practical matter, the Court was in the
awkward position of defining the reach of its own power. Standing
and other principles, then, were “rules of self-restraint,” because they
spoke to matters where the risk of encroachment into the proper
70
roles of the other branches by judicial fiat was high. Yet this led to
an amorphous doctrine because different judges emphasized different
71
considerations.
The first Burger Court opinion to focus on the parameters of
standing, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
72
Camp, thus framed a familiar and succinct generalization about
standing: “Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless
73
as such.” After concluding that the former “legal interest” test for
standing “goes to the merits,” Justice Douglas reframed the inquiry as
whether the interest the litigant sought to protect was “arguably
74
within the zone of interests” protected by the statute. From that
point on, the Court evaluated the question in that case as whether the
75
litigant had a protected interest under the statute.

68. Id. at 101–06 (adopting the “nexus test” and concluding that a taxpayer has
standing to challenge expenditures that are inconsistent with the Establishment Clause).
69. See Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund).
70. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 120 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 97 (discussing tendency to blur the two visions of the
limitation on the courts’ authority).
72. Ass’n of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
73. Id. at 151. This observation, however, does not appear to suggest that standing is
incapable of being framed in useful generalizations. Rather, it is more likely that it
reflects the state of standing jurisprudence at the time, which, as noted, frequently
referenced both the constitutional and the policy concerns implicated by the cases under
consideration.
74. Id. at 153 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
75. The Court subsequently characterized Data Processing as addressing the standing
to review federal agency action under the APA. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733
(1972). Accord Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 641 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“Data Processing held that, aside from ‘case-or-controversy’ problems not
present here, the crucial question in ruling on a challenge to standing is ‘whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’”).
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The first signs of a clear bifurcation between constitutional and
prudential standing did not appear until Justice Powell’s concurrence
76
in United States v. Richardson. In this opinion, he outlined several
critiques of Flast, including that it “purports to separate the question
of standing from the merits, yet it abruptly returns to substantive
77
Moreover, although Flast distinguished “between
issues.”
constitutional and prudential limits on standing,” Justice Powell
found it “impossible” to determine whether the nexus test adopted in
78
In a
that case was a constitutional or a prudential limitation.
footnote, he ultimately suggested that the nexus test in Flast and the
zone of interests test in Data Processing were “prudential” limitations
79
on standing.
80
Writing for the majority in Warth v. Seldin exactly one year
later, Justice Powell built upon his Richardson concurrence by
formally bifurcating standing into constitutional and prudential
81
He famously characterized “both dimensions” as
categories.
“founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of
82
the courts in a democratic society.” From there, he noted that two
concepts—generalized grievances and third-party standing—are
83
prudential limits on standing.

76. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
77. Id. at 180–81 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 181.
79. Id. at 196 n.18. He made a similar reference in a dissenting opinion two years
later. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 123 n.2 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The
[prudential] inquiry also has been framed, in appropriate cases, as whether a person with
Art. III standing is asserting an interest arguably within the zone of interests intended to
be protected by the constitutional or statutory provision on which he relies, or whether a
person should be allowed to attack a statute, not on the ground that it is unconstitutional
as applied to him, but that it would be unconstitutional as applied to third parties.”). In
another case decided the same day as Richardson, however, Justice Brennan questioned
whether the zone of interests test went to standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 236 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s further
inquiry, in each of these cases, into the connection between ‘the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question’ and the
‘interest sought to be protected by the complainant’ is relevant, not to “standing” but, if at
all, only to such limitations on exercise of the judicial function as justiciability.”).
80. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
81. See id. at 498 (concluding that the standing “inquiry involves both constitutional
limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise”).
82. Id. at 499–500. This, as noted, was clearly a fair generalization about standing
doctrine at the time.
83. Id. at 500 (stressing the separation of powers concern, Justice Powell noted that
without the bar against asserting generalized grievances and the rights of other parties
“courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even
though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions
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The zone of interests inquiry, which had not been expressly
characterized as a standing inquiry in Data Processing, soon found its
way into the prudential rubric as well. Writing for the majority in
84
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, Justice
Powell stated that Data Processing “established” the zone of interests
85
test as a “nonconstitutional standing requirement.” In Gladstone
86
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, Justice Powell, again writing for the
majority, reiterated that generalized grievances and third-party
87
standing were prudential limitations on standing. In a footnote, he
characterized the zone of interests inquiry as another
88
“nonconstitutional limitation” on standing, and much of the
remaining opinion centered on whether the petitioners fell outside
89
the zone of interests protected under the statute. Three years later,
then-Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Valley Forge Christian
90
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State
expressly incorporated the zone of interests test into the list of
91
commonly applicable prudential standing principles.
To summarize, Warth incorporated two distinct concepts—
requiring litigants to assert only their own rights and the bar against
hearing generalized grievances—into a single “prudential standing”
doctrine. Simon and Gladstone drew upon Justice Powell’s belief that
92
it was “undoubtedly true” that the zone of interests test was a
prudential limit on standing, but the Court never explained why this

and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”).
By contrast, constitutional standing centered on “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Id.
at 498–99.
84. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
85. Id. at 39 n.19.
86. Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. 91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 100 n.6.
89. Id. at 100–09.
90. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
91. Id. 474–75.
92. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring). This view was never
fully explained, but it appears to have been grounded in the conceptual similarities
between the challenge to agency decision-making at issue in Data Processing and cases
involving constitutional challenges to Congressional action, which typically involved
consideration of the generalized grievances and third-party standing principles.
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was a standing question as opposed to a straightforward cause of
93
action inquiry.
Incorporating the zone of interests test was the final step in a
remarkable transformation of standing doctrine. Flast had already
suggested that some standing rules were flexible and could thus be
94
ignored or modified. Treating the zone of interests test as one of
standing took that suggestion one step further: courts could look to
the policies advanced by the substantive law as a basis for denying
95
standing. With the Court’s subsequent formulation of the primary
96
prudential standing principles in Valley Forge, the bifurcation of
standing and incorporation of the right of action inquiry into a
distinct prudential standing doctrine was complete.
B. Prudential Principles after the Burger Court

Although the Court’s characterization of standing principles has
97
changed over time, its basic summary of the components of
prudential standing in Valley Forge has guided the lower courts for
98
more than three decades. The underlying questions concerning this
93. Other have questioned the wisdom of blurring the two concepts. E.g., Hon.
William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in
Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 403, 417 (1985) (“The question of
reviewability should in principle be distinguished from the standing requirement.
Likewise, questions as to the existence of a private right of action should be conceptually
separate from the standing inquiry. These distinctions, however, have not been uniformly
observed, and the question of the existence of a private right of action or an action for
judicial review has affected the standing analysis in some cases.”).
94. A thorough summary of the academic and judicial criticism of Flast might require
a footnote longer than the typical treatise. With respect to this discussion, however, the
opinion has been criticized for marginalizing the separation of powers concerns reflected
in other opinions. E.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611
(2007) (“By framing the standing question solely in terms of whether the dispute would be
presented in an adversary context and in a form traditionally viewed as capable of judicial
resolution, Flast “failed to recognize that this doctrine has a separation-of-powers
component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the other
branches, concrete adverseness or not.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3
(1996)). It has also been criticized for recognizing the “taxpayer’s mental displeasure that
money extracted from him is being spent in an unlawful manner” as an injury sufficient to
establish a “sufficient stake in the outcome” to satisfy Article III. Hein, 551 U.S. at 619,
623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (also noting that Flast was not distinguishable from
Frothingham because, by Flast’s logic, Frothingham had a direct interest in challenging
congressional expenditures under the “very provision creating the power to tax and
spend”).
95. See Simon, 441 U.S. at 99–100, 100 n.6.
96. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75.
97. See infra Parts I.B.1-3.
98. E.g., Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 290 (1st Cir. 2013)
(employing the Valley Forge formulation of the standard); Servicios Azucareros De
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99

formulation of prudential standing remained, even if the Court
100
glossed over them. Prudential standing doctrine has been called “a
101
twentieth-century invention of highly dubious character” and, like
102
standing generally, “amorphous.” Its expansion and application in
discrete cases has been characterized as “confused, confusing, and
103
potentially detrimental;”
“inconsistent with any coherent
104
constitutional philosophy;” and a tool for avoiding consideration of
105
the merits.
In recent years, however, members of the Court have attempted
106
to “bring some discipline” to the jurisdictional label generally and
107
Many lower courts, by contrast,
the law of standing in particular.
have not only continued to apply the principles outlined in Valley
108
Forge, but have also developed distinct standing rules of their own.
These rules build upon their perceived prudential authority to decline
jurisdiction for constitutional or pure policy reasons.

Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d 794, 801 (5th Cir. 2012) (same);
Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 340 (3d Cir. 2012) (same); Mulhall v. Unite Here Local
355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 423 (4th
Cir. 2009) (same); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).
99. See infra Parts I.B.1-3 and III.B for a detailed discussion of the disputed
foundations of each of these prudential principles.
100. See Parts I.B.1-3 (discussing the Burger Court’s treatment of each principle).
101. Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 218 (2001).
102. Jim Wedeking, Addressing Judicial Resistance to Reciprocal Reliance Standing in
Administrative Challenges to Environmental Regulations, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 535, 544
(2006).
103. David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other
Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79, 88 (2004).
104. Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 676 (2010).
105. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
106. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (observing that “a rule should
not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is,
its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction”).
107. See generally id. at 1202–03 (“Because the consequences that attach to the
jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in recent cases to bring some discipline
to the use of this term. We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as
jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or
personal jurisdiction. Other rules, even if important and mandatory, we have said, should
not be given the jurisdictional brand.”); Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1377 (questioning the
suggestion that mere prudence is a sufficient basis to refuse to hear and determine matters
within a court’s jurisdiction).
108. See supra note 92.
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Generalized Grievances
109

Although it unquestionably has “a lengthy pedigree,” the
precise foundation of the generalized grievances principle has been a
110
source of confusion historically.
The Burger Court’s attempt to
gloss over the lingering question of its constitutional and prudential
111
foundations in Warth did not fully resolve the dispute.
This
uncertainty, however, may be grounded more in the lingering
differences in judicial philosophy than in the doctrine’s ambiguous
112
history.
In any case, those who took the Court’s categorization of the
principle as “prudential”—and thus subject to modification by
Congress—would be sorely disappointed by Lujan v. Defenders of
113
The case involved an appeal of a citizen suit under the
Wildlife.
Endangered Species Act, which authorized “any person” to
114
commence suit to enjoin violations.
Thus, the only standing
question was whether the plaintiffs had constitutional standing, which
115
The Court
the divided panel decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish “actual or
116
imminent” injury. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded
that “raising only a generally available grievance about government—
claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no

109. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007).
110. See supra Part I.A.
111. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
112. See Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs:
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2010) (“The
Court has struggled to balance two competing forces. On the one hand, Article III judges
must fulfill their constitutional duty to exercise their jurisdiction to remedy violations of
federal law. On the other hand, federal courts must stay within the bounds of truly
‘judicial’ power—a deliberative decisionmaking process that requires keeping dockets at a
manageable size. Liberal Justices emphasize the first consideration and conservatives the
second one; moderates seek a middle ground. Consequently, the content of standing law
and its application have changed depending on the composition of the Court, the
majority’s view of the proper judicial role, the perceived importance of the federal law at
issue, and assorted pragmatic factors.”).
113. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
114. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals & Their Env’t v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035,
1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that this language was intended to extend standing to the
full limits of Article III).
115. Id.
116. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564–67. Justice Scalia also opined, in a portion of the opinion
that did not draw a majority, that the respondent’s failed to satisfy the redressability prong
of constitutional standing. Id. at 568–71.
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more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
117
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
Writing for the Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
118
Control Components more than two decades later, Justice Scalia
noted that Lujan demonstrates that generalized grievances “are
119
barred for constitutional reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.”
2. Zone of Interests

As noted, the zone of interests principle quickly followed the
generalized grievances principle as one of the core components of
prudential standing. Justice Powell’s concurrence in Richardson
120
characterized the principle as “undoubtedly” part of prudential
standing, and the Court accepted this classification for nearly four
121
Under this test, the court looks to “whether the interest
decades.
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
122
constitutional guarantee in question.” This test was initially limited
to review of administrative decisions under section 10 of the
123
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), but it has also been
124
Defining the scope of protected interests
applied to other claims.
under this test has historically hinged upon the statute or
constitutional right in question, with the “generous” review
provisions of the APA warranting broader prudential standing than
125
questions involving other statutory or constitutional interests.

117. Id. at 573–74.
118. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377.
119. Id. at 1387 n.3.
120. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 197.
121. See, e.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,
132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012) (characterizing the test as prudential); Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010) (same); Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12 (same);
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7 (2002) (same); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998)
(same); Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991)
(same); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (same); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (same); Gladstone
Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 n.6 (same); Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19 (same).
122. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
123. 5 U. S. C. § 702 (2012).
124. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469
(1992); Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 523; Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n,
429 U.S. 318, 320–21 n.3 (1977).
125. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163; Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16
(1987).
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In Lexmark, however, the Court unanimously concluded that the
126
zone of interests test does not speak to standing. The dispute
involved Lexmark, a company that manufactures and sells printers
that work only with its own style of cartridges, and Static Control, a
company that manufactures and sells components that allow third
parties to remanufacture Lexmark cartridges. Lexmark adopted a
“Prebate” program, under which the company gave customers a 20percent discount if they agreed to return the cartridges once they
were empty. In addition, Lexmark sent notices to remanufacturers, in
which the company advised that it was illegal to sell refurbished
Prebate cartridges and to use Static Control’s products to do so.
Lexmark sued Static Control, alleging violations of the Copyright
Act of 1976 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Static
Control countersued, alleging that Lexmark was guilty of false
127
advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“the Lanham Act”).
Specifically, Static Control alleged that Lexmark: (a) purposely
misled consumers into thinking that the “Prebate” terms were legally
binding and (b) materially misrepresented “the nature,
characteristics, and qualities” of its own and Static Control’s
128
properties in the notice sent to remanufacturers. After the district
court concluded that Static Control lacked prudential standing to
bring the Lanham Act claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
129
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address “the
reversed.
appropriate analytical framework for determining a party’s standing
130
to maintain an action for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”
At the outset, the Court questioned federal courts’ authority to
“decline to adjudicate” cases within their jurisdiction for prudential

126.
127.

128.
129.
130.

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
In relevant part, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which—
***
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384.
Id. at 1385.
Id.
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131

reasons.
Moreover, the Court concluded that Data Processing
132
Although
“rested on statutory, not ‘prudential,’ considerations.”
the Court acknowledged that it treated the test as part of prudential
standing in the past, the Court concluded that the test “does not
133
Quoting Judge Silberman, the Court explained
belong there.”
“‘prudential standing’ is a misnomer” as applied to the zone-ofinterests analysis, which asks whether “this particular class of persons
134
ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute.”
Lexmark thus establishes that the zone of interests principle only
speaks to whether the litigant has a cause of action under the
135
statute—a question that is not jurisdictional. If the principle goes to
the statutory cause of action, the court does not have the authority to
136
substitute its policy judgment concerning that right for Congress.
As the Court explained:
That question requires us to determine the meaning of
the congressionally enacted provision creating a cause
of action. In doing so, we apply traditional principles
of statutory interpretation. We do not ask whether in
our judgment Congress should have authorized Static
Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so.
Just as a court cannot apply its independent policy
judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress
has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that

131. Id. at 1386 (observing that Lexmark’s request that the Court “decline to
adjudicate Static Control’s claim on grounds that are ‘prudential,’ rather than
constitutional” was “in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that a
federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is ‘virtually
unflagging’”) (internal citations omitted). In another unanimous opinion, the Court
stressed this tension with respect to prudential ripeness later in the term. Susan B.
Anthony, 134 S. Ct. at 2347, 2341 (“To the extent respondents would have us deem
petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable on grounds that are ‘prudential,’ rather than
constitutional, that request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the
principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is
virtually unflagging.’”) (internal citations omitted).
132. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
133. Id. at 1387.
134. Id. (quoting Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 675–76 (Silberman, J., concurring)).
135. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 n.4. This conclusion reflects the Roberts Court’s
ongoing effort to “bring some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional,” which it
has limited to questions concerning the court’s subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202–03.
136. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
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Congress has created merely because “prudence”
137
dictates.
Having excised the principle from the prudential standing
doctrine, the Court further clarified the principle’s place in the cause
of action inquiry. The Court recognized that a literal reading of the
statute “might suggest that an action is available to anyone who can
138
However, it
satisfy the minimum requirements of Article III.”
reasoned that this reading is limited by two considerations. First,
“Congress is presumed to ‘legislat[e] against the background of’ the
zone-of-interests limitation, ‘which applies unless it is expressly
139
negated.’” Second, “we generally presume that a statutory cause of
action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by
140
violations of the statute.”
In sum, Lexmark returns the zone of interests inquiry to its
141
142
After Richardson and prior to Lexmark, it served as a
origins.
standalone prudential limitation on standing. After Lexmark, it
should be considered little more than one component of the
143
In the process,
presumptive limits of a statutory cause of action.
however, the Court also demonstrated that one of the underlying
purposes of recognizing the zone of interests inquiry as a component
of prudential standing—inferring limits on who may obtain relief
under the law when the statute is silent—is appropriate as part of the
144
cause of action inquiry.
The implications for similar prudential
standing tests have not been fully examined by the courts to date.
3. Third-Party Rights

The only remaining common component of prudential standing
145
This principle is
after Lexmark is third-party standing.

137. Id. at 1387–88.
138. Id. at 1388.
139. Id. (internal citations omitted).
140. Id. at 1390.
141. See infra Part I.A.1 (noting that Data Processing focused on interpreting the
statutory right of action without expressly characterizing the test as a standing inquiry).
142. Richardson, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19 (recognizing and applying the zone of interests
test as a standing test).
143. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
144. Id. at 1388–90.
145. See Chandler & Newville v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76179, 11–12 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 2014) (of prudential standing’s original core components,
only the third-party standing principle remains part of prudential standing). Cf. Calista
Enters. v. Tenza Trading Ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100923 (D. Or. July 24, 2014).
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straightforward: a litigant “generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
146
interests of third parties.” Its place in standing doctrine, however, is
not so straightforward.
The Court has long referred to third-party standing as a
prudential limitation rather than a constitutional or statutory one. In
147
Barrows v. Jackson, the Court referred to third-party standing as a
148
“complementary rule of self-restraint for its own governance.”
Similarly, in Warth, the Court characterized the “third-party
standing” inquiry as a “rule of self-governance . . . subject to
149
150
exceptions,” and in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts and
other cases, the Court referred to it simply as one of the “prudential
151
limits on standing.”
As Justice Brennan observed, the Court has
frequently based its allowance or rejection of third-party standing on
the perceived “prudence of exercising jurisdiction rather than the
152
content of substantive federal law.”
Nonetheless, in Lexmark, the Court suggested that this principle,
much like the zone of interests principle, goes to whether the litigant
153
has a cause of action under applicable law.
This dicta certainly
154
captures the tenor of some of the Court’s precedent, but, as the
(acknowledging that the Court has not expressly removed third-party standing from the
prudential rubric and thus evaluating the question as one of prudential standing).
146. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 644
(2d Cir. 1988) (noting narrow exceptions to the general rule that “a litigant is restricted to
asserting his own constitutional and statutory rights”).
147. Barrows, 346 U.S. 249.
148. Id. at 255.
149. Warth, 422 U.S. at 509; see also Raines, 362 U.S. at 22 (characterizing the
understanding that “a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities”
as one of the “‘rule[s] of practice, albeit weighty ones’” that are subject to exceptions)
(internal citations omitted).
150. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
151. Id. at 804; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v.
Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 557–58 (1996); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum, 493 U.S.
331, 336–37 (1990). As the Second Circuit recently observed, the third-party standing
doctrine “imposes only a prudential, not a constitutional, limitation” on standing. Pierre
v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39, 57 n.12 (2d Cir. 2013).
152. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 737 n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
statement).
153. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (“The limitations on third-party standing are
harder to classify; we have observed that third-party standing is ‘closely related to the
question whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action on the claim,’
but most of our cases have not framed the inquiry in that way. This case does not present
any issue of third-party standing, and consideration of that doctrine’s proper place in the
standing firmament can await another day.”) (internal citations omitted).
154. Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721 (1990); Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 n.12.
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Court observed, “most of our cases have not framed the inquiry in
155
that way.” At this point, third-party standing remains grounded in
the prudential standing doctrine and is being treated as such in the
156
lower courts.

II. Analysis: Prudential Alchemy and the Courts
To shape the remaining discussion, let us return to and recast a
157
few fundamental points. Exercising the judicial role is limited to —
158
The court’s
and an obligation of —the court’s jurisdiction.
159
jurisdiction—its power—is limited to cases or controversies.
Standing doctrine, like other justiciability concepts, relies upon an
understanding of what a case or controversy is; in this case, by
160
Yet it also
identifying the qualities that the litigant must possess.
speaks to what the judicial power is not; specifically, by reference to
161
the broader role of the courts in a democratic society.
These are
distinct but overlapping concepts that are grounded in the
Constitution.
Viewed in this way, the early “rules of self-restraint” were all
162
The
focused on remaining within the limits of the judicial power.
generalized grievances principle, for example, spoke to the role of the
163
courts in our system of governance. It respected individuals’ right
to petition the government for redress, but it limited access to the
courts to those whose grievances were properly steered to the
164
Judiciary as opposed to Congress or the Executive. Such a rule was
viewed as prudent because it went to the core of standing inquiry: Is
165
this litigant properly invoking the court’s jurisdiction?
Yet these rules were flexible because they could never fully
capture all circumstances and all considerations that might go to the
underlying questions of the judicial power and the proper role of the
Judiciary. The understanding that the judicial power is limited was
(and is) immutable; but the principles guiding the understanding of
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
See, e.g., Calista, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100923, 17–18 n.7.
See supra notes 28-29.
See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817.
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
See id. at 560.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
See supra Introduction.
Id.
Id.
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500–01.
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those limits were not. Beyond the need to draw upon different
principles to address the specific concerns in a given case, reasonable
judges could reach different results due to (i) the ambiguous meaning
of “case” and “controversy” and (ii) distinct differences of opinion
166
concerning specific limits on the judiciary’s role. All we could hope
for is that prudent judgment would lead courts to avoid
167
overreaching, though this hope hardly inspired confidence in
168
standing doctrine.
The categorization of these principles as constitutional and
prudential components of standing, however, did not solve the
problem; it transformed interpretive principles into rules of a
different character. Some principles were deemed the “irreducible
169
constitutional minimum of standing.” Others were merely flexible
170
prudential rules subject to modification by the courts and Congress.
The limits of the former in capturing the underlying questions of
standing were glossed over. The latter, at times, became untethered
from their origins, and the courts’ presumed power to erect
prudential rules spawned new pseudo-jurisdictional barriers to
171
adjudication. And if these principles were merely prudential, what
172
power did the courts have to adopt them at all?
Standing’s doctrinal foundations are arguably muddier today
than they were four decades ago. Specifically, this history suggests
two drawbacks of the modern bifurcation and categorization of
166. See Pushaw, supra note 106, at 18–19.
167. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 120 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
168. See Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 645 & n.1 (1970) (noting that “the doctrine of standing has never been
very well regarded by judges or legal scholars” and surveying criticism of the pre-Burger
Court doctrine).
169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 488 n.24 (“Neither the
Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can lower the
threshold requirements of standing under Art. III.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III
Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1226 (1993) (“If Congress directs the
federal courts to hear a case in which the requirements of Article III are not met, that Act
of Congress is unconstitutional.”).
170. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (noting that prudential rules were flexible and
non-binding on the courts); Raines, 521 U.S. at 830 n.1 (noting that Congress may
eliminate prudential rules within a statute); Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 (same);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 490, 501 (same).
171. See infra Part II.A.
172. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983) (characterizing the
bifurcation between constitutional and prudential standing as unsatisfying, in part,
“because it leaves unexplained the Court’s source of authority for simply granting or
denying standing as its prudence might dictate” and suggesting that the Court “must
always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right”).
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standing doctrine: (i) generating an expansive vision of the courts’
prudential authority to create artificial barriers to adjudication and
(ii) the potential to confuse standing doctrine by shifting its principles
from one category to the other (the “wandering principle” problem).
A. Creating Novel Barriers to Adjudication

Whatever “prudence” may have meant to the Court before and
during the Burger Court, it surely did not mean a free-floating judicial
power to carve out exceptions to rights of action under the rubric of
173
In the time since, however, the label has assumed a
standing.
broader meaning. Characterizing some principles as “constitutional”
and others as “prudential” suggested not only that some were more
fundamental than others, but also that courts had the right to create
new principles that ostensibly limit justiciability based on something
other than the idea of the proper and properly limited role of the
174
courts.
Three examples illustrate the different ways in which this has
occurred. The first involves a federal district court’s ad hoc
improvisation of a prudential rule to deny standing to litigants whose
injuries were tied to their ongoing violation of federal immigration
law. The second discusses the evolution of the prior substantial
connections test to shield the federal government from liability to
foreign citizens. The third outlines the widespread adoption of a
prudential test to limit bankruptcy appeals.
1.

Henry’s Unclean Hands

In Henry, immigrants who were in the country illegally
challenged the constitutionality of a state law that, among other
things, precluded them from obtaining drivers’ licenses and denied
175
The
them access to certain healthcare and educational benefits.
court found that several individual plaintiffs had standing under
173. See Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Sotomayor, J.) (“[T]he prudential requirements of standing have been developed by the
Supreme Court on its own accord and applied in a more discretionary fashion as rules of
judicial self-restraint further to protect, to the extent necessary under the circumstances,
the purpose of Article III.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. E.g., Servicios Azucareros, 702 F.3d at 797 (discussing lower court order denying
prudential standing because the plaintiff was a foreign citizen suing a United States
citizen); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussing lower court
order finding white plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Title VII); Nat’l Coalition of
Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91487, 22–23 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 12,
2007) (immigrants in the country illegally denied standing based on an “unclean hands”
prudential theory).
175. Henry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91487, at 2–5.
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Article III. However, drawing upon the unclean hands doctrine,
the court adopted a “a new, and narrow, prudential limitation on
178
standing”:
An illegal alien, in willful violation of federal
immigration law, is without standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a state law, when compliance with
federal law would absolve the illegal alien’s
constitutional dilemma—particularly when the
challenged state law was enacted to discourage
179
violation of the federal immigration law.
No other court has adopted this rule to date.
2.

Prior Substantial Connections and Foreign Citizens

A prudential rule that has gained more traction—the prior
substantial connections test—expressly targets foreign citizens who
have been harmed by American officials outside of the United States.
180
In Atamirzayeva v. United States, for example, Zoya Atamirzayeva
alleged that her cafeteria in Tashkent, Uzbekistan was razed by local
authorities at the request of United States embassy officials so they
181
could build a security checkpoint. After being denied remuneration
for her losses, she sued in the Court of Federal Claims. The court
framed the issue as “whether a foreign plaintiff or owner has standing
to assert a claim for just compensation based on the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment for an alleged taking by the United States of
182
property located abroad.”
Drawing upon the application of the
“prior substantial connections” test in United States v. Verdugo183
Urquidez and cases involving Takings Clause claims by foreign

176. Id. at 19.
177. Id. at 24–25.
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id.
180. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
181. Id. (plaintiff alleged that embassy officials were also present and oversaw the
destruction).
182. Id. at 384.
183. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (defendant, a Mexican
resident and citizen, did not have a Fourth Amendment right to suppress evidence seized
from a warrantless search of his home because he had no “previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States”).
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citizens, the court found that the plaintiff lacked standing.
As
Jeffrey Kahn recently opined, the evolution of this prudential
standing test has been remarkable:
The “prior substantial-connections” test is an example
of doctrinal metamorphosis at its worst. The case that
created it, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, rejected
on the merits a criminal defendant’s claim that the
Fourth
Amendment
required
exclusion
of
incriminating evidence obtained by American officials
acting abroad without a warrant. In less than twenty
years that holding has “slipped the surly bonds” of
constitutional criminal procedure. In Zoya’s case, and
increasingly in many others, the test has been
transformed into a jurisdictional inquiry into a
plaintiff’s civil litigation. A starker legal transplant in
such a short span of time—or one as dangerous to our
186
system of justice—is hard to find.
3.

The Bright-Line Test for Bankruptcy Appeals

Nowhere is this tendency to modify substantive rights through
prudential standing doctrine more obvious than the widespread
adoption of the pecuniary interest test for bankruptcy appeals.
Federal law provides clear guidance concerning the appellate process
187
in bankruptcy, but it places few explicit statutory limits on the right
188
Bankruptcy proceedings “typically
to appeal bankruptcy orders.
involve a ‘myriad of parties . . . indirectly affected by every
bankruptcy court order,’” and it “could be argued that all of the

184. See Hoffmann v. United States, 17 Fed. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (German
citizens did not have rights under the Takings Clause to recover photographic archives and
paintings seized by the United States Army during World War II); Rosner v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (plaintiffs were not U.S. citizens at the
end of World War II, when their valuables or ancestors’ valuables were seized, so they had
no right to compensation under the Takings Clause); Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl.
438, 444 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (foreign citizen lacked standing to seek compensation for the
occupation and destruction of his property in connection with United States military
operations in Mogadishu, Somalia).
185. Atamirzayeva, 77 Fed. Cl. at 387 (noting that employing the standing test rather
than consideration of the merits promoted “the efficient disposition of this case.”).
186. Kahn, supra note 104, at 676 (citations omitted).
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 158.
188. ALAN RESNICK & HENRY SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 5.07 (16th ed.
2014) (“No indication is given either in title 11 or title 28 regarding the requisites for
standing to appeal an order of the bankruptcy court.”).
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creditors and the debtor are parties to every order entered in a
189
bankruptcy case[.]” Courts and commentators have thus expressed
concern that “procedural chaos” would ensue if all of these parties
190
were free to appeal, thereby undermining one of the objectives of
191
bankruptcy law: expeditious case administration.
The former Bankruptcy Act addressed this risk, in part, by
limiting the right to appeal summary orders issued by the referee
192
under section 39(c) of the Act. Specifically, this section authorized
a “person aggrieved” to petition for review of the order within 10
193
days after its entry. The term “person aggrieved” was not defined
194
195
in the Act, but courts tended to interpret it broadly: An appellant
had to demonstrate that “his property may be diminished, his burdens
increased or his rights detrimentally affected by the order sought to
196
be reviewed.” In cases involving only financial disagreements, some
189. Id. § 8001.5.
190. Id. (explaining that appellate courts adopted the person aggrieved test to avoid
“procedural chaos” that might result from allowing all parties to appeal).
191. E.g., Cult Awareness Network v. Martino (In re Cult Awareness Network), 151
F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (The bankruptcy “system works because it processes debtors
and their creditors in, we hope, an expeditious manner.”).
192. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 39(c), 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938) (amended 1960, repealed
1978) (“A person aggrieved by an order of a referee may, within ten days after the entry
thereof, or within such extended time as the court may for cause shown . . . file with the
referee a petition for review of such order by a judge and serve a copy of such petition
upon the adverse parties who were represented at the hearing . . . . Upon application of
any party in interest, the execution or enforcement of the order complained of may be
suspended by the court upon such terms as will protect the rights of all parties in
interest.”).
193. Id. Courts interpreting this section most often focused on whether the 10-day
limitation was jurisdictional. See, e.g., Pfister v. N. Ill. Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144, 153 (1942)
(discussing the circuit split on the question and concluding that it was not). Congress
amended the rule in 1960 to make the rule mandatory rather than permissive. See In re
Best Distrib. Co., 576 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing the legislative history of
the amendment and noting that it was intended to provide certainty and finality with
respect to bankruptcy orders).
194. Brown, supra note 46, at 603 (“The term ‘person aggrieved’ was not defined in
the Act, and General Order XXVII [which governed bankruptcy appeals prior to the
Chandler Act] did not expressly require a pecuniary interest to appeal an order of the
referee.”).
195. E.g., In re Record Club of America, Inc., 28 B.R. 996, 997 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
(characterizing “person aggrieved” as “broadly defined”). Accord Akins, 524 U.S. at 19
(“History associates the word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to cast the standing
net broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon
which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”).
196. In re Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 117 F.2d 191, 193 (7th Cir. 1941); see also In re
E. C. Ernst, Inc., 2 B.R. 757, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); In re Capitano, 315 F. Supp. 105
(E.D. La. 1970) (same); In re Terrace Superette, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 371, 375 (W.D. Wis.
1964) (same). Cf. In re First Colonial Corp., 544 F.2d 1291, 1296 (5th Cir. 1977) (“only
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courts reasoned that “to be a ‘person aggrieved’ one must be directly
and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the referee which is
197
challenged.”
Whatever the test, courts were largely focused on
limiting the right to appeal to those whose interests were protected
198
under the statute and directly implicated by the order appealed.
Although Congress considered and decided against including a
199
similar restriction on bankruptcy appeals in the Bankruptcy Code,
district and circuit courts nonetheless concluded that they had the
prudential authority to limit appellate standing to “persons
200
aggrieved” in cases under the Bankruptcy Code as well.
These
those who have a ‘direct and substantial interest in the question appealed from’ are
‘aggrieved’”).
197. Hartman Corp. of America v. United States, 304 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1962) (“It
is safe to say that to be a ‘person aggrieved’ one must be directly and adversely be affected
pecuniarily by the order of the referee which is challenged. After all, practical common
sense need not be entirely divorced from bankruptcy proceedings.”); see also Kapp v.
Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1979) (employing similar language); In re J.M.
Wells, Inc., 525 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1978) (employing similar test and finding debtor suffered
no injury in fact to warrant standing to appeal fee award to estate counsel because his
“assets were substantially exceeded by his debts”). These cases consistently involved
purely financial disputes. Hartman, for example, involved an out-of-the-money debtor’s
appeal concerning the allowance of a tax claim. 304 F.2d at 430–31.
198. See, e.g., Imperial Bowl of Miami, Inc. v. Roemedmeyer, 368 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
1966) (bankrupt and a prospective bidder lacked standing to appeal sale order because the
law governing asset sales was not designed to protect their interests); Castaner v. Mora,
216 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1954) (debtor was not aggrieved by sale of assets that belonged to
the estate because that section focused on creditor protection); In re Rea Holding Corp.,
447 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (unsuccessful bidder lacked standing to contest
order approving sale because the law was designed to protect creditors of the estate, not
bidders for estate assets).
199. See Brown, supra note 46, at 594–95 (demonstrating that different limitations
were considered and dropped from the legislation). Accord Richard B. Levin, Bankruptcy
Appeals, 58 N.C. L. REV. 967, 976 (1980) (“Undoubtedly, Congress’s intent to make the
new bankruptcy courts more like the federal district courts, the absence of any statutory
standing definition for ordinary civil appeals, and the extensive case law construing
‘person aggrieved’ led Congress to omit a statutory standing definition. Whatever the
reason, the omission appears deliberate. No other explanation seems plausible in view of
the detailed character of the remainder of the law.”). This is most likely due not only to a
transformation of bankruptcy courts’ roles but also the fact that the Bankruptcy Code
protects a broader range of rights and interests than the Act. See Brown, supra note 46, at
593–600.
200. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988)
(“Although the present Bankruptcy Code does not contain any express restrictions on
appellate standing, courts have uniformly held that the ‘person aggrieved’ standard is
applicable to cases under the Code.”); In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co., 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS
30813 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1986) (“The general consensus among courts that have considered
the matter seems to be that the former Bankruptcy Act’s ‘person aggrieved’ test should be
applied as a matter of judge-made law.”); In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d
507, 513 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopting standard as a prudential limit on standing); In re
Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (1983) (same); In re Multiple Servs. Indus., Inc., 46 B.R. 235,
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courts referenced the different approaches to interpreting the term
201
under the Act, but most latched onto the “directly and adversely
202
affected pecuniarily” language.
Recognizing this pecuniary interest requirement as a component
of prudential standing may not have seemed like a significant
transformation. By 1978, the Court’s characterization of the zone of
interests inquiry as one of prudential standing was already well203
established. Moreover, shortly after Data Processing, some courts
either read the requirements of section 39(c) as prudential limits on
standing or applied the zone of interests test as a distinct limitation on
204
bankruptcy standing. Thus, by the time the Bankruptcy Code went
into effect, the courts had ample support for their authority to craft
prudential standing rules grounded in the zone of interests protected
by the law and the view that the pecuniary interest test was a
prudential standing inquiry under the Act. It was merely a matter of
shifting from one source of prudential authority to limit standing to
another.
Even if this final step was modest, the transformation of the
pecuniary interest test over time was remarkable. Specifically, the
test began as (i) one consideration in (ii) the interpretation of
236 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (“The prevailing opinion among courts and commentators who have
addressed this issue is that the ‘person aggrieved’ standard is still valid even though section
39(c) has been repealed.”).
201. See, e.g., In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154–55 (1st Cir. 1987) (limiting
appeals to “those persons whose rights or interests are ‘directly and adversely affected
pecuniarily’ by the order or decree of the bankruptcy court.”) (“A litigant qualifies as a
“person aggrieved” if the order diminishes his property, increases his burdens, or impairs
his rights.”).
202. See, e.g., Kane, 843 F.2d at 642 (“A person who seeks to appeal an order of the
bankruptcy court must be ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily’ by it.”); Fondiller,
707 F.2d at 442 (“Only those persons who are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily
by an order of the bankruptcy court have been held to have standing to appeal that
order.”); In re Revco, D.S., Inc., 99 B.R. 778, 779 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (applying the test and
denying standing to the United States Trustee); Behling v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank
Silver Spring Div., 86 B.R. 144, 146 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (applying the test and denying
standing to an insolvent debtor); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 B.R. 994, 996 (E.D.N.C.
1987) (applying the Fondiller formulation of the test).
203. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 123 n.2 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring).
204. See, e.g., In re Harwald Co., 497 F.2d 443, 444–45 (7th Cir. 1974) (referencing
section 39(c) in connection with the zone of interests inquiry to determine whether a
losing bidder had standing to question the structure of the sale); In re De Gelleke Co., 411
F. Supp. 1320, 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (evaluating standing in bankruptcy matter as a zone
of interests question); In re Kundert, 401 F. Supp. 822, 825 (D.N.D. 1975) (applying the
zone of interest test to an equal protection challenge concerning a homestead exemption
in bankruptcy); see also In re Beck Indus., Inc., 605 F.2d 624, 634 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
Harwald and adopting the same rule).
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statutory language (iii) concerning who has a right to appeal (iv) an
order of the bankruptcy referee (v) concerning summary matters.
Within a few years of the Bankruptcy Code’s adoption, the pecuniary
interest inquiry was (i) the primary, if not exclusive, test (ii) of a
judicially created prudential limitation (iii) concerning who has
standing to appeal (iv) an order issued by the bankruptcy court or
district court (v) concerning any matter. This transformation has
arguably undermined the interwoven protections incorporated into
the Bankruptcy Code, generated conflicting standing precedent
concerning these protections, and delayed the administration of cases
where those with protected non-pecuniary interests were forced to
205
pursue additional appeals to protect them.
The issue for the purposes of this discussion is not the wisdom of
206
the policy judgments guiding the development and evolution of
these rules. Rather, it is the fact that the power to decline jurisdiction
may be driven by such policy concerns at all. Courts “have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to
207
usurp that which is not given” for a reason: They play an essential
role in vindicating individual rights. Yet, as these cases suggest, the
power to create new standing rules that are grounded solely in a
judge’s conception of good policy also carries with it the power to
create or destroy these rights at will.
B. Wandering Principles: When Jurisdictional Rules Become NonJurisdictional and Vice-Versa

The “wandering principle” problem arises when courts revisit
and transfer a standing principle from one category—“constitutional”
or “prudential”—to the other. This reclassification of a principle as
one or the other may have significant implications because, as noted
205. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Brown, supra note 46 (discussing
cases demonstrating the potential for the rule to distort the application of bankruptcy law,
conflicting circuit court opinions where one court applied the test as a bright-line rule and
the other found the rule in conflict with the objectives of the Code, and the costs and
delays associated with appeals challenging the application of the test to non-pecuniary
issues).
206. However, others have advanced compelling critiques of some of these choices
elsewhere. Id. (discussing and criticizing use of “prior substantial connections” prudential
standing test to refuse consideration of foreign citizen claims); Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV 1081, 1096–
97 (2010) (“Excluding foreign plaintiffs based on standing similarly evokes both prudential
and policy considerations. By excluding a particular class of litigants, the doctrine indeed
reduces the administrative burden of the courts. But the policy questions are even more
central: by adopting such a doctrine, the court is also affecting economic, political, and
regulatory interests in ways that may have substantial ramifications.”).
207. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.
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previously, the former is treated as jurisdictional and the latter is
208
not.
For example, the generalized grievances principle was one of the
209
two original “prudential” principles identified by the Burger Court.
In Lujan, however, the Court said it was mistaken: the rule is really
210
constitutional.
Thus, a rule that federal courts could previously
choose to disregard and Congress could write out of the statute
became presumably unassailable.
The ambiguities of modern standing doctrine are also captured in
211
United States v. Windsor, albeit in the other direction. There, the
Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of Section 3 of the
212
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).
Edith Windsor, whose
partner died in 2009, was denied the estate tax exemption under
DOMA and commenced suit, contending that DOMA was a violation
of the guarantee of equal protection under the law. While the suit
was pending, the Executive Branch elected to no longer defend
DOMA in the courts, but it continued to enforce its provisions.
Thereafter, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the
House of Representatives intervened as an interested party. The
district court ruled in favor of Windsor, and the Second Circuit
affirmed. The Court affirmed.
213
To address the first consideration of standing doctrine —
whether the party invoking the judicial power presents a case or

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra notes 157–58.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
That section of the act provided:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) and 1
U.S.C. § 7).
213. The Court’s treatment of the second consideration of standing doctrine—the
broader role of the courts in our system of governance—is not relevant to this part of the
discussion, but it nonetheless provides some insight into the justices’ distinct visions of the
role of the Judiciary. The majority took what might charitably be described as a broad
view. “[I]f the Executive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is unconstitutional is
enough to preclude judicial review, then the Supreme Court’s primary role in determining
the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff who has brought a
justiciable legal claim would become only secondary to the President’s.” Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2688 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). In the majority’s view, recognizing
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controversy—the majority framed adverseness as “flexible” and
“subject to ‘countervailing considerations [that] may outweigh the
214
concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power.’”
The United States had a “stake sufficient to support Article III
jurisdiction” because it had a financial interest; albeit an interest it
215
refused to defend before the Court. This refusal, the majority held,
could be corrected by the presence of an interested bystander who
216
defended the law vigorously.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia was astounded by the majority’s
approach; reasoning that it “bears no resemblance to our
217
jurisprudence” and was “incomprehensible” because adverseness is
a necessary element of having an actual case or controversy as
218
required by Article III. “Relegating a jurisdictional requirement to
standing conformed to “the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers principle that when
an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id.
Justice Scalia, however, found this characterization of the Judiciary’s role “jawdropping” and “unrecognizable to those who wrote and ratified our national charter.” Id.
at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, the judicial role, Justice Scalia noted, has
always been understood to be limited to resolving disputes, not “say[ing] what the law is.”
Id. at 2699. This limitation on the judicial role was adopted to guard democratic self-rule
against “black-robed supremacy,” even if “some questions of law will never be presented
to this Court.” Id. at 2698, 2699. Thus, instead of respecting separation of powers, Justice
Scalia noted that the majority’s reasoning “envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather
enthroned) at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional questions,
always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.” Id. at 2698.
214. Id. at 2687.
215. Id. at 2686 (financial interest in not paying a tax refund to the plaintiff was a
sufficient “personal stake” for the Article III standing purposes).
216. Id. at 2687–88.
217. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (“A plaintiff (or appellant) can have all the standing in the world—satisfying
all three standing requirements of Lujan that the majority so carefully quotes—and yet no
Article III controversy may be before the court. Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or
appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party who denies the validity of
the complaint.”).
Has adverseness actually been treated as a component of constitutional standing?
One of the cases cited by both the majority and the dissent, Camreta v. Greene, might be
read either way:
Article III of the Constitution grants this Court authority to adjudicate
legal disputes only in the context of “Cases” or “Controversies.” To
enforce this limitation, we demand that litigants demonstrate a
“personal stake” in the suit. The party invoking the Court’s authority
has such a stake when three conditions are satisfied: The petitioner
must show that he has “suffered an injury in fact” that is caused by
“the conduct complained of” and that “will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” And the opposing party also must have an ongoing interest

126

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42:1

‘prudential’ status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the
requirement whenever they believe it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a
219
good idea.”
In this respect, Lujan and Windsor highlight an intrinsic problem
with the categorical application of standing principles: Prudential
principles are flexible until they are deemed inflexible; and seemingly
constitutional principles are unchanging until they are changed. Their
categorization as one on Tuesday and the other on Wednesday
supports the perspective that standing may “apparently be either
rolled out or ignored in order to serve unstated and unexamined
220
values.”
More to the point, Lujan and Windsor highlight a problem with
the current bifurcation and categorization of standing doctrine: The
principles employed to understand the judicial power and the
Judiciary’s role are less than absolute yet grounded in something
221
more than mere prudence. This may explain why, notwithstanding
222
its characterization as the “irreducible constitutional minimum,”
in the dispute, so that the case features “that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues.” To ensure a case remains
“fit for federal-court adjudication,” the parties must have the
necessary stake not only at the outset of litigation, but throughout its
course.
131 S. Ct. 2020, (2011) (internal citations omitted). On the one hand, it states that
concrete adverseness is necessary throughout the dispute. On the other, the reason for
this is to sharpen presentation of the issues, which seems merely prudential.
Digging further, the phrase that explains the need for concrete adverseness quotes
Los Angeles v. Lyons, which explained: “Plaintiffs must demonstrate a ‘personal stake in
the outcome’ in order to ‘assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues’ necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions.”
461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204). That opinion, in turn, quoted
Baker, which couched concrete adverseness as “the gist” of the Court’s power to declare a
statute unconstitutional. 369 U.S. at 204 (“A federal court cannot ‘pronounce any statute,
either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the
Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies.’ Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.”). One could be forgiven, then, for
understanding continuing concrete adverseness to be more than merely prudential.
219. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Nichol, supra note 23, at 658. Accord Tushnet, supra note 19, at 699 (arguing that
the standing principles adopted by the Burger Court “have more than an air of
arbitrariness about them.”).
221. Others have suggested that there is no practical distinction between prudential
standing and constitutional standing. See, e.g., Sohn, supra note 6, at 728.
222. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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223

constitutional standing has proven reducible.
It may explain why
the majority in Windsor could proceed to the merits notwithstanding
the absence of traditional adverseness; the requirement’s foundations
were sufficiently ambiguous to support classifying adverseness as
224
merely prudential. In sum, debates over the classification of specific
225
principles mask underlying differences in judicial philosophy and,
accordingly, appear to add unnecessary confusion to an already
amorphous area of law.

III. Proposal: A Prudent Demise
226

“[W]hat courts have created, courts can modify,” and the
Court’s recent opinions challenge the very foundations of prudential
227
standing as a distinct doctrine. The Court has not gone far enough.
My proposal contains two elements. First, standing doctrine
should be limited to constitutionally oriented interpretive principles
that are recognized as such. Put simply, there should be no distinct
prudential branch of standing doctrine. Second, and relatedly,
principles that are currently characterized as prudential should be
reconsidered. And to the extent they do not provide a unique
function in addressing the constitutional purposes of standing
doctrine, they should be reclassified or abandoned entirely; not
treated as pseudo-jurisdictional limits on standing.
A. A Uniform Approach to Constitutionality

All standing rules originated in the same basic objective: shaping
the understanding of the role of the Judiciary. Some were designed
to capture what is meant by “case” or “controversy.” Others
reflected different conceptions of the relative role of the Judiciary to
the other branches. Some touched upon both. And as guideposts for

223. See generally Lee & Ellis, supra note 6 (discussing the erosion of standing
doctrine).
224. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.
225. See Pushaw, supra note 106, at 18–19.
226. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1937 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing prudential barriers to habeas relief).
227. See Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 758 F.3d 592,
603 n.34 (5th Cir. 2014) (questioning viability of the doctrine); W. Va. Auto. & Truck
Dealers Ass’n v. Ford Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73452, 11 n.5 (N.D. W. Va. May
30, 2014) (noting that Lexmark “calls into doubt whether prudential standing remains a
viable concept”); see also Ky., Educ. & Workforce Dev. Cabinet, Office for the Blind v.
United States, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13801, 14–15 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014) (after Lexmark and
Driehaus, “the continuing vitality of the prudential aspects of standing and ripeness” are
“in doubt”).
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understanding the role of the Judiciary, they could not capture every
circumstance.
If standing is limited to these questions, which—if any—of the
remaining prudential principles warrant inclusion? I propose shaping
this inquiry by reference to the origins of standing doctrine. First,
does the principle add any unique value in determining whether the
litigant advances a case or controversy beyond the core standing
inquiry? If not, does it uniquely address “weightier considerations of
228
constitutional adjudication”?
With respect to the first question, some guiding principles—such
as those that comprise the current Article III standing rule—are said
to speak directly to the case or controversy requirement. Some
229
principles, however, may only reframe others. To that end, they are
not properly characterized as distinct rules but should be referenced,
if at all, only to the extent they provide value in understanding those
other principles. And if grounded in the suspicion that the litigant
230
has no cause of action after a “peek at the merits,” the answer is not
to toss the action out; it is to consider and address the merits in full.
The second question focuses on how the principle captures other
concerns that uniquely limit the Judiciary’s role for two reasons.
First, it distinguishes justifications that have their origins in Article
III—for example, rules that implicate separation of powers only
because the litigant lacks Article III standing—from those that are
231
based on other separation of powers considerations.
Looking to
separation of powers as an independent justification just muddies the
discussion.
Second, it highlights the distinction between standing and
inquiries that go to other justiciability questions. It may be that some
of these weightier considerations are already captured by other

228. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818.
229. See infra Part III.B.
230. Accord Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
545 F.3d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Silberman, J.) (noting that courts “peek at the merits, at
least insofar as is necessary to determine whether the petitioner has an arguable claim that
falls within the zone-of-interests protected.”).
231. These other separation of powers functions have been characterized as the “prodemocracy” and “anti-conscription” functions of standing. Heather Elliott, The Functions
of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008) (distinguishing these functions from the
“concrete adverseness” function). The former limit standing where the Court concludes
the issues are better left to the other branches, and the latter “prevent Congress from
conscripting the courts to fight its battles against the executive branch.” Id.

Fall 2014]

THE STORY OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING

129

principles, so a distinct standing doctrine is superfluous and adds an
232
unnecessary layer to the analysis.
B. The Third-Party Rights Principle

The third-party rights principle has consistently been identified
233
The
as discretionary but guided by constitutional concerns.
rationale begins with a common presumption: parties “usually will be
234
the best proponents of their own rights.” To that end, it is said that
denying standing to assert the rights of others “assures the court that
the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented,” which “is
not completely separable from Article III’s requirement that a
plaintiff have a ‘sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of [the]
235
suit to make it a case or controversy.’” Thus, the limitation “frees
the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on
constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of
statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be
236
cloudy.”

232. Heather Elliott, for example, has proposed supplanting standing doctrine
altogether with “a vibrant abstention doctrine that permits it to pursue separation-ofpowers goals without the obfuscation caused by standing doctrine.” Id. at 464. Moreover,
it may be that some of these questions are answered through the political question
doctrine rather than standing, especially given the degree to which the generalized
grievances test has altered the underlying question of the relative roles of the branches.
See generally Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1203 (2002) (discussing the two doctrines).
233. E.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 804; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75; Gladstone Realtors,
441 U.S. at 99; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; Raines, 362 U.S. at 21; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255.
Beyond the institutional concern, the Court has, at times, invoked a private one: “the
third-party rightholder may not, in fact, wish to assert the claim in question[.]” Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 446 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Singleton, 428 U.S.
at 113–14 (“courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in
fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy
them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not”); Planned Parenthood
of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 794 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The principal objection to
third-party standing is that it wrests control of the lawsuit from the person or persons
primarily concerned in it.”). Under the circumstances, it is difficult if not impossible to
know if the litigant will advance the injured party’s interests. At the extreme, the litigant
may pursue the matter to achieve results that harm the party the law seeks to protect. I do
not consider this separately because (i) the Court has never suggested that this implicates
the judicial power and (ii) the analysis is ultimately the same as with the institutional
concerns.
234. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
235. Sec’y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 n.5 (1984); see also U.S.
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 409–10 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(discussing the constitutional and prudential dimensions of third-party standing).
236. Raines, 362 U.S. at 22.
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The difficulty in examining the third-party rights principle lies in
237
Litigants raise the interests of others in
its diverse application.
public and private disputes, and the institutional concerns may vary
238
from one case to another. At most, the only common institutional
question across cases is whether a litigant who asserts the rights of
others presents a case or controversy.
Looking to the case and controversy question, the third-party
rights inquiry is clearly not independent; it is a reformulation of
Article III standing principles. For example, in connection with
discussing Article III standing, the Court stated that a litigant must
have a sufficient personal stake to “warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction,” and this must be demonstrated “for each type of
239
relief sought.” The third-party standing principle assumes that the
inverse must also be true: The litigant may not advance another’s
240
right of action.
Thus, interested bystanders are typically excluded
241
on constitutional standing grounds.

237. Cf. Scott, supra note 159, at 646 (making a similar observation about standing
generally).
238. The separation of powers concern may be clear, for example, when a litigant
invokes the rights of others to challenge the constitutionality of the law. It is far less clear
when Bob asserts Sue’s contract rights in a lawsuit against Joe. Likewise, the private
autonomy concern is understandable when the litigant is a stranger or clearly adverse to
the right-holder. It is less clear when the party asserting the right-holders’ right of action
is a fiduciary acting in his personal capacity, a spouse, or other party whose interests
appear to be aligned with the absent parties.
239. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (Scalia, J.).
240. Although this may be the basic premise, others may have standing to assert the
rights of third parties where: (i) the party asserting the right has a ‘close’ relationship with
the person who possesses the right” and (ii) “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s
ability to protect his own interests.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004).
241. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (opponents of same-sex
marriage lacked standing to appeal order holding Proposition 8—which amended the
California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California”—unconstitutional); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 56
(1986) (“conscientious objector” to abortions had no cognizable interest in upholding state
abortion law); see also Olick v. City of Easton (In re Olick), 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12603,
6–7 (3d Cir. July 3, 2014) (trustee could not assert the due process rights of the trust in his
personal capacity); Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (10th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (environmental groups may have advanced a cognizable Article III injury,
but they could not assert the federal government’s interest in its property rights in an
action against a local government where applicable law did not create a private right of
action); N’Jai v. U.S. EPA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75712 (W.D. Pa. June 3, 2014) (plaintiff
lacked standing to assert negligence claim on behalf of an unrelated child who moved into
her former apartment after she moved out); Trans-Lines W., Inc. v. Lines, 203 B.R. 653,
660 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (trustee of a corporate debtor lacked standing to challenge
validity of revocation of Subchapter S status because that right belonged to shareholders,
not the estate).
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However, the inverse is not always true; litigants invoke the
rights of others for a variety of reasons. For example, litigants: (i)
242
assert rights that are disputed; (ii) advance rights that are derivative
243
of the rights of third parties; or (iii) invoke third parties’ rights as a
244
With few
component of their own asserted right of action.
exceptions, these cases will not have any preclusive effect on an
245
absent third-party.
Assuming the litigant has standing under the
core Article III standing inquiry, what other questions must be
addressed?
246
All three scenarios require more than a “peek at the merits” to
understand the parties’ respective rights. In the first scenario, the
court must evaluate the ownership question to determine whether the
litigant is asserting another party’s rights. The second scenario hinges
upon the legal question of whether derivative rights are sufficient to
support a cause of action. In the third, the question is whether the

242. See, e.g., Dexter v. Freddie Mac, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83077, 7–8 (E.D. Mich.
May 30, 2014) (plaintiff lacked standing to advance mortgage fraud claim because she had
no interest in the mortgage or property and, at most, was advancing the rights of the
property owner).
243. See, e.g., Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130–31 (attorneys lacked third-party standing to
assert the rights of future, as yet unascertained clients with whom “they ha[d] no
relationship at all”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (licensed beer vendor asserting
potential customers’ equal protection rights); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12519, 17–20 (6th Cir. July 2, 2014) (nonparty to a
settlement may have had an indirect interest in the settlement’s effect, but it lacked
standing to challenge the parties’ interpretation of the settlement); Hillside Metro Assocs.,
LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 747 F.3d 44, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We conclude that
Hillside does not have prudential standing in this case because it cannot enforce the terms
of the [contract], as to which it is neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary, but the
enforcement of which is a necessary component of its claim.”); Critical Nurse Staffing, Inc.
v. Four Corners Health Care Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82857 (D. Utah June 17, 2014)
(healthcare provider lacked standing to sue competitor for fraud that lured away former
clients because the right of action belonged to former clients, not the healthcare provider);
Steverson v. Dantone, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79238, 4–5 (D. Md. June 9, 2014) (“Nor does
Plaintiff Steverson, the coach of the girls’ basketball team, have standing to bring a Title
IX sex discrimination claim against Defendant Imagine for discrimination against the
female players of the girls’ basketball team.”); Cmty. County Day Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of
Erie, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97300 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (school lacked standing to
assert interests of students and parents in statutory reimbursements for special education
and healthcare services).
244. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (criminal defendant invoking rights
of prospective jurors to not be excluded on the basis of race); Sec’y of Md., 467 U.S. 947
(1984) (fundraiser asserting constitutional rights of charity as part of his defense);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives asserting
constitutional rights of unmarried persons as part of his defense).
245. See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (rejecting the “virtual
representation” doctrine and discussing the narrow exceptions to non-party preclusion).
246. Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 11.
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third-party rights are relevant considerations in the litigant’s cause of
action.
What do these scenarios tell us? If these claims ultimately fail, it
will be because the litigant is unable to prove the merits of his case.
At a minimum, it is proper to invoke the court’s authority to answer
these questions. And if the court rules unfavorably, the case will
ultimately be dismissed because it fails on the merits. Standing has
nothing to do with it.

Conclusion
Established doctrines die hard. For all the criticism of the
standing doctrine generally and prudential standing specifically over
the last four decades, it may be difficult to accept that prudential
standing is a misnomer. It may be harder still to accept that
constitutional and prudential standing are one in the same. Barring
further action by the Court, however, it may be easier for lawyers and
the lower courts to cling to the now familiar rules that remain
untouched.
Nonetheless, I have demonstrated that it is time to write the
epilogue for the story of prudential standing. A doctrine that
originated in rules demanding respect for the limits of the judicial
power became a source of authority for erecting pseudo-jurisdictional
bars when courts felt it made sense. At the same time, the term
labeled some rules that historically guided the courts’ understanding
of their proper role as discretionary (prudential) and others as
irreducible (constitutional), suggesting that prudential rules could be
ignored when the court felt it was a “good idea.”
By contrast, a unified standing doctrine that is grounded solely in
shaping the courts’ proper and properly limited role should resolve
these issues. This change would bring further discipline to a doctrine
that goes to the heart of the judicial role. And in setting firm limits
on the reach of standing doctrine, it may return us to a vision of
judicial prudence as a desirable quality rather than a justification for
refusing to hear and decide difficult or undesirable cases.

